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ies and International Relations in general  – should move away from 
the traditional variables like population, size of terri tory, eco nomy and 
military often used in defin ing states and their influence within regional 
and international organizations, and instead examine more relevant 
qualitative factors such as administrative characteristics, image and 
political willingness.
The original power balance: Off to a flying formal start
During the negotiations leading up to the creation of the European 
Com munities, the original small member states – the Benelux states of 
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – were highly concerned 
with their limited economic and military capabilities compared with 
the three larger members. In the end, the institutional structures took 
account of their demands for a more balanced decision-making sys-
tem. The small states were granted a proportionally larger voice within 
the new institutions compared with (West) Germany, France and Italy. 
This arrangement, enshrined in the Treaties, mainly took the form of 
each member state’s veto right within the Council of Ministers; equal 
access to the policy-making structure of the European Commission; 
and a proportionally higher number of representatives from the small 
countries in the European Assembly. Also, the new institutions of the 
Com munities were sited mainly in the small countries. More generally, 
in the most innovative feature of the 1957 Treaties of Rome, power 
was transferred from the stronger (and sometimes aggressive) states to 
supra national bodies where the interests of small states could be bet-
ter taken into account. This unprecedented institutional set-up pro-
vided the small countries with the chance to influence policy-making 
at the European level to an extent never seen before. It gave the small 
mem ber states a flying start within the Communities.2 
The original power balance: ‘Realpolitik’ 
However, it soon became clear that France and Germany would retain 
the initiative in the process of European construction. Their close 
cooperation became the vehicle for steps towards further integration. 
Their role reflected their greater resources compared with the other 
members, and their political motivation, including how they wanted 
to be portrayed (their ‘image’) at home and abroad. The eco nomic 
and administrative capabilities of the larger members, and later their 
military contribution to the protection of Western demo cracies, gave 
these two states and Italy a much greater say than that of their three 
Summary
Small EU member states need to exploit the special character-
istics of their small public administrations in order to secure 
their interests and have influence within the Union. They must 
develop an administrative competence based on features like 
informality, flexibility, and the autonomy of officials operating 
according to guidelines rather than fixed negotiating instruc-
tions. They also need to acknowledge their limitations, and 
set priorities to a much greater extent than the large states. 
A strategy based on these features, combined with a positive 
image and political willingness, can bring negotiating success 
within the EU’s decision-making processes.
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Introduction
Small member states of the European Union today face new and chal-
lenging tasks. They have had to cope with the damage from a difficult 
eco nomic and monetary crisis, either within their own borders or at the 
EU level. With the resumed security threat from the East, those on the 
eastern borders of the Union have either strengthened their defences and 
called for a firmer security stance from the EU as well as NATO – or have 
reluctantly joined, against their perceived best interests, in EU sanctions 
against Russia. More broadly, small nations have to deal with an increas-
ingly fast-evolving EU of 28 member states, and with ever-more complex 
decision-making processes within existing and recently developed insti-
tutions and units. How do small countries with limited administrative 
capacities – not to mention weaker economic and military capabilities 
than large member states – cope with these challenges? Do small states 
stand a chance of having a say in today’s European Union?
      This policy brief enquires into the methods and tools that small 
states can apply in order to defend their interests and influence deci-
sion-making in the EU. It examines the typical structural weaknesses 
of small states within the EU, and how they try to overcome them. The 
main focus is on how small states can use special features of their pub lic 
administrations, foreign services and EU delegations – features associ-
ated with their smallness – to compensate for their limitations and 
gain influence. We look mainly at small states’ interactions with and 
within two EU institutions: the European Commission and the Coun-
cil of the European Union. Further, we briefly discuss the impor tance 
of image and political will in allowing small states to gain recog nition 
and become influential within the Union. In light of the findings, this 
paper argues that small-state studies – and the field of Euro pean Stud-
1 The author is grateful for invaluable assistance from Alyson J.K. Bailes, University of Iceland.
2 Baldur Thorhallsson (2004), ‘Can small states influence policy in an EU of 25 members?’, in 
Erhard Busek og Waldemar Hummer (eds), Liechtenstein Politische Schriften, vol. 39, Verlag 
der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft, pp. 330–347.
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smaller partners in the Union. The creation of the Euro pean Council, 
though informal in nature at first, gave heads of govern ments an increased 
possibility to influence the overall develop ment of the European project, 
as well as the nitty-gritty details in each and every policy field. When the 
UK and later Spain joined the others, claiming their own space at the 
negotiation table of the European Council, they in turn became more 
pivotal actors than the smaller newcomers Ireland, Denmark, Greece and 
Portugal.3 Recently, Poland has become more assertive within the Union 
and has been more inclined to use the typical bargaining tactics of other 
large states (see below) than are the other, smaller newcomers in the EU.4 
Normally, the six states mentioned so far are regarded as the EU’s ‘large’ 
states, and all others as part of the small states group.5  
Prioritization
Small states set priorities for their activities within the EU. They tend to 
concentrate on policy sectors where direct benefits can be gained. More-
over, they focus on particular issues within these policy areas in order to 
guarantee their interests.11 For instance, Luxembourg has put great effort 
over the years into securing favourable deals for its finan cial sector; the 
Baltic states have been giving priority to secure energy supplies from the 
West, smooth adoption of the euro, and what ever degree of protection they 
can gain from the EU’s defence and security policies. Cyprus is an example 
of a small state that uses its strength mainly in connection with resistance 
against favourable EU policies towards Turkey and occupied North Cyprus.
   Small states are forced to prioritize because of the small size of their 
admi ni strations. They cannot take part in all the EU’s activities, and 
must reluctantly admit that have to miss some meetings within the EU 
insti tutions due to their limited staff numbers. This is particularly the 
case with preparatory panels, experts and comitology committees in the 
Com mission.12 Moreover, officials of small states often attend meetings 
simply to observe the ongoing debate without any intention of influenc-
ing it. To counter this problem, Luxembourg has an arrangement with 
Belgium – the only such case – whereby it can be represented by the 
lat ter in several meetings.13 Also, Luxembourg has required practical 
assi stance from the Netherlands during its tenures in the EU Council 
Pre si dency; for reasons of convenience, the presidencies of Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands are always paired in sequence with each other.14  
   On the other hand, the narrower range of interests of small states within 
the EU makes it not only possible but viable for them to prioritize more 
strictly. The economies of the small member states rely on fewer export 
pro ducts: for instance, two or three agricultural products under the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy may account for a much larger share of their final 
agricultural production than those of the large states.15 Hence, small 
states can prioritize to a much greater extent than the large ones, with out 
damaging their interests. They do, however, need a pro cess for identi fying 
the priorities that will yield objectively sensible results, and that can com-
mand domestic acceptance and understanding from at least a majority of 
citizens. Diverging sectoral interests and ideological differences (including 
pro- and anti-EU views) can arise in small states just as they can in larger 
ones. If a small state’s elite leans too far one way or gets too far ahead of 
domestic sentiment, it may have to pay for this with politi cal reverses that 
in turn can threaten the coher ence and credibility of its voice in Europe.16 
Informality and flexibility – greater autonomy of officials
Within small states, the working procedures for handling EU affairs are 
charac terized by informality and flexibility. The small size of the bureau-
cracy allows for smooth and efficient decision-making. Officials tend to 
know each other and a certain trust seem to be inbuilt with a small public 
admi nistration. Decisions are often taken in informal meet ings or over the 
telephone. On the other hand, officials in the EU dele gations of small states 
claim that they often lack information and clear objectives from their capi-
tals. Normally, they receive guidelines instead of instructions, which may 
also be oral rather than written. They are formally and informally expected 
to find their own way of par ti cipating in the EU decision-making process. 
Hence, officials from small states have greater autonomy and are expected 
to take their own initia tives in order to succeed in EU negotiations. Still, 
if needed, they can easily contact higher-ranking officials who have the 
authority to alter major decisions. Moreover, they will receive written 
instructions from their ministries if the issue at stake is of great importance 
for the country – as is common practice in the case of larger states.
3 Baldur Thorhallsson (2000), The Role of Small States in the European Union, Aldershot: Ashgate.
4 For instance, see the government of Poland (2014) 10, PL-UE Poland 10 Years in the European 
Union, http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/ef26c779-74e4-4a0c-aa73-0a9d3c8b695c:JCR
5 Baldur Thorhallsson (2006), ‘The Size of States in the European Union: Theoretical and Concep-
tual Perspectives’, Journal of European Integration, 28 (1): 7–31. 
6 Population in millions as of 1 January 2014: Eurostat, accessed 25 February 2015 at http://ec.europa.
eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00001&plugin=1; GDP: Gross 
domestic product at market prices, Eurostat, accessed 25 February 2015 at http://ec.europa.eu/eu-
rostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tec00001&language=enf; Foreign 
service personnel – excluding personnel employed locally by missions abroad: Information collected 
in foreign ministries in every member state in April 2001.
7 Clive Archer and Neill Nugent (2002), ‘Introduction: Small States and the European Union’, Cur-
rent Politics and Economics of Europe, 11(1): 1–10.
8  Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl (2004), ‘Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World’, in C. Ingebritsen, 
I. Neumann, S. Gstöhl & J. Beyer (eds), Small States in International Relations, Reykjavik: Centre for 
Small State Studies, University of Iceland.
9 Caroline Grön (2014), Small States Seeking Influence in the European Commission: Opportunities and 
Constraints, Research Consortium, Small State Briefs, Centre for Small State Studies, Jean Monnet 
Centre of Excellence, University of Iceland.
10 Diana Panke (2010), Small States in the European Union: Coping with Structural Disadvantages, 
(Farnham: Ashgate).
States
Small states
Malta
Luxembourg
Cyprus
Estonia
Latvia
Slovenia
Lithuania
Croatia
Ireland
Slovakia
Finland
Denmark
Bulgaria
Austria
Sweden
Hungary
Portugal
Czech Republic
Greece
Belgium
Netherlands
Romania
Large states
Poland
Spain
Italy
United Kingdom
France
Germany
Population 
(millions) 
2014
0.43
0.55
0.86
1.3
2
2.1
2.9
4.2
4.6
5.4
5.5
5.6
7.2
8.5
9.6
9.9
10.4
10.5
10.9
11.2
16.8
19.9
38.5
46.5
60.8
64.3
65.9
80.8
GDP (thousands 
of millions of 
euros) 2013
7.5
45
18
19
23
36
35
44
175
74
202
253
41
323
436
101
171
157
182
395
643
144
396
1 049
1 619
2017
2144
2809
Foreign service 
personnel 
April 2001
256
206
231
479
455
451
440
820
931
1642
1663
1397
1500
1923
2038
2165
1810
2103
3050
2730
2619
4688
5500
9800
6515
Year 
of EU       
entry
2004
1958
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2013
1973
2004
1995
1973
2007
1995
1995
2004
1986
2004
1981
1958
1958
2007
2004
1986
1958
1973
1958
1958
Table 1: Member States of the European Union: Size Index6 
11 Thorhallsson 2000; Panke 2010.
12 Per Lægreid (2000), ‘Implications of Europeanization on Central Administration in the Nordic 
Countries’, paper presented at IASIA Annual Conference, Beijing 10–13 July 2000, Working 
Group III: Public Service Reform.
13 Thorhallsson 2000.
14 Dirk Jan Van den Berg (1994), ‘The Netherlands and Luxembourg: Smaller Countries in an Ever-
Larger Europe’, Journals: European Institute of Public Administration (EISPASCOPE) 3, Maas-
trich, pp. 1–4; Thorhallsson 2006. On the current rotation of the EU Council Presidency see: 
https://www.lietuva.lt/en/explore_lithuania/pirmininkavimas_es_tarybai_1/presidency_of_
the_council_of_the_eu;
15 Thorhallsson 2004.
16 Alyson J.K. Bailes (2009), Does a Small State need a Strategy? Reykjavik; Centre for Small State Stud-
Structural disadvantages 
of small states in the EU
Small states face political 
and administrative problems 
within the EU decision-mak-
ing processes due to their 
more limited resources. They 
have fewer instruments to 
pur sue their interests and are 
often regarded as reactive in 
the international community, 
com pared with the proactive 
approach of large states.7 The 
International Relations literature in general regards them as having built-
in structural weaknesses due to their economic and political vulnerability, 
reflecting their small domestic markets and their lack of defence and admin-
istrative capabilities.8 
   Caroline Grön9 argues that lack of resources is a key constraint even for 
the relatively richest and best-organized small states after joining the EU. 
Diana Panke10 claims that small states face structural disadvantages within 
the EU based on voting power and bargaining capacity. Firstly, they have 
few votes in the Council, and negotiations take place in the shadow of vot-
ing calculations even if the final decisions are generally taken by consen-
sus. Accordingly, the larger states have a greater say in working groups, in 
the Committee of Permanent Repre sentatives, in the Political and Security 
Committee and in the Coun cil itself. Secondly, small states are less able to 
offer side payments than the large states due to their limited financial and 
econo mic capabilities. Thirdly, a small country is seen as a less valuable coa-
lition member than a large country. A winning coalition must have a few big 
states and several small states – and drawing a large state into a coalition 
is more valuable than accommodating a small state. Fourthly, small states 
have smaller public administrations, smaller ministries and delegations. 
Moreover, they will often lack policy and scientific expertise in many sectors.
   The big question is how small states can compensate for their greater vul-
nerability within the EU. How can a small states move from being reac tive 
and become proactive? How can special features of small communities, 
related to administrative characteristics, image and political willing ness, 
help out? And basically: how do small states keep their heads above water?
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The important role of EU delegations
Officials in small states’ Permanent Representations to the EU, located in Brus-
sels, play a greater role than do their counterparts in large states. They par-
ticipate in domestic policy-making in their capitals as well as in Brussels. They 
are more often responsible in their own right for negotiations in the Council than 
in the case of the large states, which more often send ex perts from ministries to 
negotiate on their behalf. An official from a small state is expected to specialize 
in a particular issue or policy field – but is also required to have a good overview 
of EU poli cies and attend meetings on a range of topics, as discussed below. 
The wider role of officials
Officials in the public administrations of small states dealing with EU affairs tend 
to have much wider responsibilities than their counter parts in the large states. 
The same official in a small country may participate in domestic policy-making 
while also contributing to policy for mation in the Commission. He or she may 
negotiate in Brussels on behalf of his or her state and take the final decision on a 
given Com mission proposal in one of the working groups of the Coun cil. The same 
official will sometimes advise the minister in the Council and have responsibility, 
with others, for deciding on criteria and guide lines in the comitology commit-
tees run by the Commission. Fin ally, the same official may advise on or take a 
direct part in the im ple mentation process of the resultant directive in his or her 
home capi tal. This is never the case with the six large member states. Their larger 
bureaucracies operate with a much clearer divi sion between pol icy-making, 
negotiating and the implementation process. Inter estingly, in the mid-1990s, 
the Netherlands – which had not experienced the same smooth flow of officials 
between these different phases as the other small states – made explicit efforts 
to adopt this small-state tactic in order to cope with the growing EU workload.17  
Negotiation strategies
The European Studies literature has generally held that small states have 
less influence on security policy than on other policy fields; moreover, that 
coali tion building has been crucial when small states have succeeded in 
influencing EU policy.18  
    Panke19 argues that several features can help small member states to punch 
above their weight within the EU: these features include years of member-
ship (lengthier membership automatically relates to greater know ledge), 
dom es tic political stability, priority-setting (as discussed above), the use of a 
broad range of negotiation strategies, clear negotiating instructions (a clear 
national position), and active participation in negotiations. Small states have 
especially good chances of succeeding in negotiations, according to Panke, if 
they use persuasion-based stra tegies rather than bargaining-based ones, can 
demonstrate a decisive level of knowledge, and present their case as entailing 
benefits for other member states and for the greater European good.
   Small states in general have two possible negotiating strategies. One, they 
can become proactive in EU policy-making only when issues of direct national 
interest are on the agenda. In such cases they tend to start with an inflexible 
negotiation strategy, but are also concerned not to become isolated in the 
bargaining, and thus are often more willing to compromise at an early stage. 
However, and secondly, they will be reactive and flexible regarding issues of 
little national interest to them. Here they will devote all their administrative 
capacity to guar an teeing a favourable outcome in sectors of importance.20  
   The larger states tend to adopt an inflexible negotiating strategy on all 
occa sions. Their veto threat is taken seriously – unlike the veto threat of 
smaller states. Consequently, the small states tend to emphasize the cul ture 
of consensus, and prefer bargaining in the form of ‘package deals’ where 
they can give priority to a few issues of importance, setting aside others. By 
contrast, the larger states have sufficient admin istra tive capa city to focus 
on all the EU’s policy sectors and have a wid er range of interests within it, 
inter alia as regards controlling EU expen ditures and securing their own 
international positions. Networking and coalition build ing are central to 
all member states, but small states have a greater need to form alliances 
with other members and the Commission (as discussed below) due to their 
lesser capacity and reduced political clout, also as regards veto power.21 
 
Relations with the European Commission
The small states will use the features identified above also when working with 
and within the Commission. Their relations with the Commission are charac-
terized by their reliance on it, whether working in its own committees or in the 
Council. This is because small states often lack information in policy areas of 
limited domestic importance, and are in greater need of Commission know-
how and guidance in negotiations in the Council than are the large states. As a 
result, small states tend to cooperate with the Commission whereas the large 
states are much more confrontational towards it.22 At the same time, small 
states face vari ous constraints when lobbying the Commission due to their 
limited resour ces and lack of focus on Commission processes: this has been 
shown at least in the case of two small states, Denmark and Sweden.23 
   Small states try to influence proposals in the initial stages within the 
committee system of the Commission.24 They will call upon the Commis-
sion to act as a mediator between them and the large states, and gener-
ally prefer to deal with issues at the Commission level rather than having 
to negotiate with all EU member states in the Council. 
   The special features of small public administrations, such as informal-
ity and flexibility,  help the small states to develop ‘a routine work ing 
pro cess’ with the Commission. A few officials, often just one or two, in a 
small country will be in direct contact with Commission officials regard-
ing any given proposal. On the Commission side, there will often be only 
one rapporteur dealing with the particular proposal. Hence, a close work-
ing relationship can be established between these actors on each side 
of the table, and can make communication and decision-making much 
smoother than in the case of the large states. In the process, the Commis-
sion can gain special insights into the situation in these small countries. It 
is particularly relevant for the Commission to develop good relations with 
the officials of small states, precisely because they tend to be personally 
involved at all levels of EU affairs. These officials can make an important 
con tribution to the drafting of proposals and can often respond swiftly 
to new developments in negotiations, making decisions autonomously. 
Such relations can facilitate mutual understanding between the small 
state and the Commission, giving the former better chances of getting its 
views incorporated in the Commission’s policy proposals. It is true that a 
larger state may be a more valuable coalition partner for the Commission 
– but it is often much cheaper ‘to buy’ the support of a small state than 
a big one. That said, the Commission is not ultimately or in any simple 
sense the defender of small-state interests. Also small states must fight 
their way through the Commission if they want to convince it that their 
ideas should be incorporated into its proposals.25  
   Findings by Grön (2014) indicate that civil servants from two small states, 
Denmark and Sweden, regard technical propositions as the most efficient 
way to convey their inputs, along with proposals that embody the EU gen-
eral good and can lead to a compromise. Grön argues that Denmark and 
Sweden can impact legislation considerably if they lobby the Commission 
early on in the decision-making process and provide technical input.26  
   In the new College of Commissioners appointed in 2014, small states are 
in a particularly strong position. The President of the Commission comes 
from one of the smallest member states (Luxembourg) and six out of its seven 
Vice-Presidents are also from small states (Finland, Latvia, Slovakia, Estonia, 
Nether lands and Bulgaria). The sole exception is the High Representative of 
17 Thorhallsson 2000.
18 Baldur Thorhallsson and Anders Wivel (2006), ‘Small States in the European Union: What do we 
know and what would we like to know?’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 19 (4): 651–668; 
D. Arter (2000) ‘Small State Influence within the EU: the Case of Finland’s Northern Dimension Initi-
ative’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(5): 677–697; Ivo Maes and Amy Verdun (2005) ‘Small 
States and the Creation of the EMU: Belgium and the Netherlands, Pace-Setters and Gate-Keepers’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 43(2): 327–348; Anders Wivel (2005),’ The Security Challenge 
of Small EU Member States: Interests, Identity and the Development of the EU as a Security Actor’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 3(2): 393–412; S.W. Duke (2001)’ Small States and European 
Security’, in E. Reiter & H. Gartner (eds.) Small States and Alliances (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag), 
pp. 39–50.
19 Panke 2010.
20 Thorhallsson 2000.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Grön 2014.
24 Thorhallsson 2000; Panke 2010.
25 Thorhallsson 2000.
26 Grön 2014.
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the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who comes from Italy. The media 
and even the academic world would be likely to conclude that the large states had 
taken over the Commission if it had been they who filled most of these posts.
 
Image
Small states build their international image on domestic reputation and knowledge in 
particular policy fields.27 Christine Ingebritsen28  argues that small states can become 
norm-setters in regional and international orga ni zations. For instance, domestic 
success and deep-rooted knowledge on cer tain internationally salient issues such 
as environmental protection, human rights, women’s rights, and humanitarian and 
development assistance have had enormous value for the Nordic states’ position 
within the EU. These states have created a positive, progressive and responsible 
image of themselves internationally, using it to place issues on the agenda, build 
coa litions, and get their ideas accepted within the EU. They have thereby become 
what the literature calls ‘norm entrepreneurs’. For instance, the three Nordic states 
have managed to use their favourable image as environmentally friendly countries 
to make their voice heard, even to take the lead, within EU environmental policy.29  
   Furthermore, a stable political system and good governance at home can become a 
soft power tool. This has often held good for the Bene lux and Nordic member states 
within the EU, who regularly rank near the top of the Vision of Humanity organiza-
tion’s Global Peace Index, which measures both internal and external behaviour.30 
For similar reasons, personalities from small states are often entrusted with medi-
ating or investigatory duties that raise both their own and their nation’s profile: a 
practice also reflected in the EU’s choice of Special Representatives, other emissar-
ies, and commanders for Common Security and Defence Policy missions. 
   However, small states need to have a certain critical mass of administrative 
com petence to transform their positive image in a specific policy field into a 
power resource.31 A focus on making technical inputs on prioritized proposals 
can be particularly cost-effective for them. Small states can punch above their 
weight if they are able to use their knowledge as a power tool in providing help-
ful information for other members and the Commission, thereby getting espe-
cially good chances of influencing the technical side of proposals.32 
Political will
States also need to have the political will and ambition to take an active part in EU 
decision-making. Some states may simply lack ambition in this respect,33 as has 
been seen (for different reasons) in the cases of Greece34 and Slo venia.35 Politi-
cal leaders need to be willing to spend time, effort and money on working within 
the EU.36 Moreover, the governing elite must believe that it can have a say in the 
decision-making processes. If it considers its chances hopeless and/or sees the EU 
as doomed to be ineffective on a given issue, it may not even try to contribute to 
or influence decision-making.37 But there are positive examples: most members of 
the Danish political elite appear to be confident of guaranteeing Danish interests 
within the EU; they want to keep Denmark at the heart of the European integration 
process.38 Personal leadership skills and ability to take initiatives are of enormous 
value in such cases when combined with political willingness to influence EU 
decision-making. This has been clearly demonstrated, as noted, with regard to the 
impact of the three Nordic EU member states on environmental policy.
Conclusions
In order to answer the original question ‘How do little frogs fly?’ we need to consider 
the capacity and immediate environment of that little amphibian. Importantly, the 
frog must acknowledge its limitations: it has to accept the fact that it cannot fly! On 
the other hand, with sufficient practice, it may be able to leap high and far – which, 
in this metaphor, corresponds to the importance of administrative competence of 
small states within the EU. Indeed, some clever frogs can leap high enough to get 
themselves out of a well – but they still need a good level of general ‘dampness’ in 
the environment in order to survive, reflecting the small states’ reliance on a favour-
able political culture and decision-making system within the EU. 
The original set-up of the European Communities gave the small states a flying start. 
In the new millennium and in response inter alia to successive enlargements, the 
large states have made numerous attempts to alter the power balance between them-
selves and the group of smaller members. However, the small states have managed 
to resist radical changes that would alter the EU decision-making system in favour 
of the large ones,  and can still exercise considerable influence within their chosen 
policy fields. In particular, and despite repeated prophecies, the enlarged EU has not 
developed a regular ‘hard core’ or limited ‘directoire’ of its largest members. 
   This policy brief has argued that, by avoiding and continuing to avoid such devel-
opments, turning the special characteristics of small public administration into 
advantages can prove to be a winning (and cost-effective) tactic for the smaller 
players. However, small states also need to develop administrative competence 
based on these features, and combine this with a positive image and political will-
ingness, in order to have a say within the EU. Any attempt to predict or explain 
their relative success must pay attention to such features just as much as, if not 
more than, those conventional parameters of state size: power and wealth.
34 Thorhallsson 2000.
35 Cirila Toplak, ‘Small States in Europe: Slovenia and its position within the European Union’, lecture at the 
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36 Grön 2014.
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Mouritzen (eds), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook, 1998 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International 
Affairs), pp. 9–25.
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27 Thorhallsson 2006.
28 Christine Ingebritsen (2004), ‘Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics’, in C. Ingeb-
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